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The lack of convergence of growth rates among the world economies is probably one of the
most debated topics in the last few years in theoretical and empirical research. In this period we
have observed a strong resurgence of the debate about long-run growth, starting from the initial
contributions by Paul Romer (1986) and Robert Lucas (1988) who opened the so called
“Endogenous Growth Theory” or “New Growth Theory”. The reason of this resurgence of
interest lies in two important aspects left unsolved by the theoretical attempts of the 60s and 70s:
first, the need to explain long-run growth determinants and secondly, to provide a careful
explanation to the lack of convergence of growth rates among world economies footnote . The
biggest achievement of the Endogenous Growth Theory is represented by the reconciliation of
the diminishing returns hypothesis with the typical finding of empirical analyses, i.e. a growth
rate continuously increasing.
There are many explanations of the lack of convergence of growth rates. Among the
empirical studies on convergence we consider Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) who analyzed the
different definition of convergence expressed as absolute and relative, according to the emphasis
given to the initial endowments and the saving rate footnote . However, probably, one of the
most important explanations for the divergence of growth rates lies in the heterogeneity of fiscal
policies adopted by different countries. The present paper tries to explain the lack of
convergence by invoking differences in fiscal policies, as explained by the more recent literature.
Differently from the growth theory of 60s and 70s, the endogenous growth theory shows
many interesting features to the link between fiscal policies and growth. When growth is
endogenous, policy actions affecting the saving rate (fiscal policy can be though as a typical
example of such a policy), have growth effects and not only level effects. This means that fiscal
policy affects the steady state growth rate on a Balanced Growth Path (BGP, thereafter) and not
only during the transition from one steady state to the other.
Fiscal policy in growth models can be analyzed within a wide range of contexts: (i)
representative agents models with infinite horizon; (ii) overlapping generations models; (iii)
redistributive models with electoral competition about the level of fiscal pressure. Given the
enormous degree of development reached in each of the above fields, the present survey will
concentrate mostly on representative agent models with infinite horizon, with a special emphasis
on two-sector models with human capital footnote . The reason of this choice has to do with the
goal of analyzing the growth effect of flat rate taxes and how various assumptions on the
production function for physical and human capital, will interact to assess the magnitude of fiscal
policy. The models under point (ii)-(iii) focus more on the redistributional effects of fiscal
policy, and they take as given the effect of fiscal policy on growth.
A very important point concerns the endogeneity of public expenditure in endogenous
growth models: unfortunately, not much work has been done in the infinite horizon framework
apart the initial contribution by Barro (1990), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) and the literature
on redistributional issues. In this survey I will present both the aforementioned contributions and
some extensions to the two-sector framework by Corsetti and Roubini (1996).
In what follows the focus will be only on deterministic models, without exploring the
implications of the stochastic growth models with fiscal policy. The goal of stochastic growth
models is different: they take as given the existence of a BGP to explain the origins and causes of
economic fluctuations originating around it. To do so, they try to replicate the observed behavior
of time series of income, consumption, investment and other relevant macroeconomic variables,
by adding to the model shocks - technological or fiscal - which could generate such fluctuations.
The model is evalued according to its ability to replicate the observed behavior of time series.
Those models are in the tradition of Real Business Cycles (RBC) literature. The difference with
the RBC typical assumption is that a fiscal policy shock - together with a pure technological
shock - is assumed to be the origin of economic fluctuations footnote around a BGP exogenously
given. In the case of pure deterministic growth models, instead, we keep fluctuations as
exogenous to the model and the goal is to explain the existence of an unceasing growth.I will not touch empirical aspects of the relationship between fiscal policy and growth. For a
survey of the empirical results on fiscal policy and growth I address the reader to other surveys,
like, fore example, Easterly et al. (1992), Engen and Skinner (1992), Levine and Renelt (1992).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the reader to the
analytical context employed in the subsequent sections, by surveying the basic mechanisms
underlying endogenous growth mechanisms. Section 3 analyzes endogenous growth models
driven by human capital accumulation, while the role of the innovative activity as engine of
growth is discussed in section 4. Income taxation is discussed in section 5 under the usual two
formulation of an income tax and a tax on private inputs. In section 6 there is an extensive
discussion on endogenous fiscal policy. In this context,. models without and with human capital
are analyzed in order to evaluate different distorsive effects of taxation. Section 7 studies a
growth model with monopolistic competition and differentiated goods. The effect of endogenous
labor supply under various specifications is discussed in section 8. The effect of consumption
and investment taxation is discussed respectively in section 9 and 10. Section 11 provides a brief
discussion on optimal taxation issues. Concluding Remarks close the paper.
Endogenous growth: an introduction
The fundamental question to which endogenous growth theory deals with is: why can
long-run growth be kept constant and unceasing over time ?
From the exogenous growth models we know that if the production function respects the
Inada conditions, the law of diminishing returns makes the long run growth rate equal to zero. In
fact, the traditional literature on growth stopped in the early 70s because of its inability to
explain the continuously increasing growth rate empirically observed for all developed
economies. During past years, this problem has been brilliantly solved by Paul Romer and Robert
Lucas who offered two alternative explanations to the long-run growth. On the one hand, the
proposed solution hinges on the role played by externalities in the production function of final
goods. The presence of externalities has a countervailing effect on the law of diminishing
returns, as stressed by Romer (1986). On the other hand, there is the two-sector growth model by
Lucas (1988) which is built on the previous work by Uzawa (1964), where the growth engine is
represented by human capital accumulation.
As discussed by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), quite all the models of endogenous growth
can be represented along the lines discussed by these models. To introduce the analytical
framework employed throughout the paper, in what follows I will sketch the two classes of
models just mentioned.
Let us start by considering a Cobb-Douglas production function such as:
Yt = AtKt
JZt
1?J   #   
where 0 < J † 1. In ( ref: uno ) Kt indicates physical capital and Zt is a whatsoever input
having a countervailing effect on the decreasing returns to scale associated with Kt for which an
appropriate qualification will be offered later on. At is a scale parameter. In a one good model
like this, the aggregate final product can be either invested or consumed. The capital
accumulation is governed by the following equation:
.
Kt = Yt ? Ct ? NKKt   #   
where NK is the depreciation rate on physical capital.
With competitive markets for the productive inputs, the real interest rate must equate the
marginal product of capital:
rt = JAt
J?1
  #   
From ( ref: tre ) we observe that Zt should operate in such a way that real interest rate never
declines over time when Kt increases. The countervailing effect will be complete if J = 1.
The preference structure in this context is subsumed by the following utility function of





1 ? a dt   #   
where _ > 0 is the discount rate. The representative agent chooses the optimal quantity of
consumption Ct and investment by maximizing ( ref: quat ) subjected to ( ref: due ). After






= rt ? _ ? NK
a   #   
Moreover, L ‡ 0 if and only if rt ‡ _ + NK. It is also easy to verify that when J = 1 the growth
rate L will be strictly positive if and only if A > _ + NK.
The above mechanism is a schematic description of the basic features of the endogenous
growth models: the growth rate is always positive because of the presence of some mechanism
able to contrast the effects of the law of diminishing returns.
Growth driven by Human Capital
The simplest way to represent the role of human capital is to imagine an aggregate
production function like y = Ak where k can be interpreted as aggregate capital in a broad sense.
The definition of k encompasses both physical and human capital. In this context, it is just the
assumption that human and physical capital are included in one term that gives the production
function having the property of constant returns to scale. In this case, the marginal product of
aggregate physical capital is constant as well, making the growth rate constant and positive.
An explicit treatment of human capital requires the analysis of a two-sector growth model
with separate accumulation and production processes for physical and human capital.
Therefore, let us assume in ( ref: uno ) that Z = H, where H is the level of human capital.
The accumulation constraint for human capital:
6
Ht = IH ? NHHt   #   
where IH is the amount of new human capital produced net of depreciation NHHt, with NH being
the human capital depreciation rate. In order to get tractable closed-form solutions, assume that
the production function of new human capital IH is:
IH = Bt￿v2tKt￿
K￿z2tHt￿
1?K   #   
with 0 < K † 1 and with Bt = B - t on a BGP. Also, ( ref: uno ) can be rewritten as footnote :
Yt = At￿v1tKt￿
J￿z1tHt￿
1?J   #   
with 0 < J † 1 and with At = A - t on a BGP.
In ( ref: sette ) and ( ref: otto ) v1t (v2t) indicates the fraction of physical capital employed in
the production of final goods (human capital), while z1t (z2t) represents the fraction of human
capital employed in the production of final goods (human capital). This model is generalization
of Lucas (1988) model and Rebelo (1991). In particular, Lucas (1988) assumes that the
production function of human capital is linearly homogeneous in Ht: this means that with K = 0
the only argument of the human capital production function is human capital itself, because
IH = Btz2tHt. To obtain a closed-form solution, I assume that the depreciation rate for both
physical and human capital are the same, i.e. NK = NH = N. Given the utility function ( ref: quat )
we obtain an expression for the growth rate still given by ( ref: cinque ) but with the following










  #   
From ( ref: nove ) we observe that interest rate r is a function of all the technological parameters
of the model which are assumed to be constant on a BGP. Therefore, the growth rate of this
economy will be constant as well and positive if r > _ + N. The expression for the interest rate in
the Lucas (1988) model can be obtained as particular case of the model considered here, afterimposing K = 0 in ( ref: nove ) to get r = B.
The two-sector model has a transitional dynamics which has been carefully studied by
Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1992) using the time elimination method. Without entering into the
details of the model, it is possible to say that if there are not adjustment costs for physical and
human capital, all the inputs are totally free to move from one sector to another and there does
not exist any transitional dynamics at all. Therefore, without adjustment costs, the two-sector
model has the same qualitative behavior of the ‘Ak model’, as discussed by Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (1995) footnote .
Growth driven by innovative activity
In this class of models the engine of growth is represented by the activity of technological
innovation conducted at level of each single firm, having the goal of obtaining a monopoly profit
from selling new goods on the market, as originally pointed out by Schumpeter and Kaldor.
Aggregate knowledge derived from investment in R&D is considered as an externality and has
the characteristics of public good nonrival and partially excludable. After that new goods entered
into the market, the innovative component of those goods becomes a fraction of aggregate
knowledge available to all other firms that can imitate these goods and erode the initial
monopoly power of the firm who started first. Those issues can be treated in two class of models.
The first assumes the presence of externality connected to the accumulation of a particular good,
like knowledge, which are external to the firm but internal to the industrial sector or a market.
This allows to keep together the structure of a perfectly competitive market, and the profit
motivation for accumulating knowledge is implicit in the model. The second class of models,
instead, explicitly considers the profit motivation leading to the innovative activity in a model
with monopolistic competition in the final goods sector.
In the first class of models, according to Romer (1986), Zt in ( ref: uno ) represents the
aggregate level of knowledge available to a given economy. Zt is a public good non-rival and
non-excludable: knowledge is freely available to every agent of the society at no. The diffusion
of knowledge is realized in two ways: through specialized journals, reviews and newspapers and,
most importantly, through the sales of final goods produced by using investment in R&D realized
at the level of each single firm. Given n the number of producer-consumers of an
economy footnote , Z can be defined as Z = nk. The interest rate is by r = JA which, evidently,
is independent from k, and is therefore constant. The consequence of this will be a growth rate
continuously increasing over time. On the other hand, if J < 1 the BGP just obtained is
suboptimal because of the presence of the externality deriving from Z, which is not taken into
account by a single-profit maximizing firm. A social planner will choose the optimal
accumulation path by taking into account the externality effects: in this case interest rate would
be r = A.
The second class of models can be analyzed along the lines of Romer (1990) where the




where A is a scale
parameter (constant), and the Zt factor is given by Zt = X
0
Nt z￿i￿di. Zt can now be interpreted as
the sum of all the i-th capital goods z￿i￿ produced by using the i-th project. HR is the amount of
human capital employed in the production of new designs, while Nt indicates the total amount of
designs of the economy. In this model the growth engine is entirely represented by the
production of new projects which is assumed to be a linear function of Nt:
6
Nt = DHRNt   #   
where D is a scale parameter.. Equation ( ref: dod ) describes the growth rate of new designs: the
amount of new projects Nt depends linearly on the existing level of projects footnote . The level
of scientific knowledge represents the basis for further development of new projects. It is
precisely in this sense that the existing amount of projects represents a positive externality. The
growth rate of the economy is then given by ( ref: dod ), and it is constant because HR is assumed
to be constant on a BGP. The mechanism just described and the relationship expressed by( ref: dod ) offsets the decreasing returns to scale, keeping bounded away from zero the growth
rate of this economy footnote .
Income Taxation
In this section, I start with the analysis of the role of fiscal policy in endogenous growth
models. This section considers the effects of fiscal policy created by income taxation under two
qualifications: a pure income tax and a set of differentiated taxes on the returns on productive
inputs.
The income tax
Consider now the introduction of a flat tax rate b on the aggregate income Yt produced by
using a Cobb-Douglas production function ( ref: uno ). The income net-of-taxes is:
Yt = ￿1 ? b￿AtKt
JZt
1?J   #   
Clearly, from ( ref: tred ) the rate of return on the invested capital will be:




  #   
After a quick inspection of ( ref: tred )-( ref: quatdici ) we note that the income tax reduces the
real return on invested capital and inhibits the incentives to capital accumulation. As an example,
consider now the Ak model. Given the utility function ( ref: quat ), the growth rate for the Ak
model with a tax rate on income is:
L = ￿1 ? b￿A ? N ? _
a   #   
In the model with knowledge spillover, as in Romer (1986,1989), the growth rate is:
L = ￿1 ? b￿JA ? N ? _
a   #   
In the two-sector model with human capital accumulation à la Rebelo (1991), the growth rate
after tax will be:
L = 1
a ￿￿1 ? b￿KQ￿
1
1?J+K ? N ? _   #   








In the model with capital accumulation à la Lucas (1988) with IH = Btz2tHt inserted in
( ref: sei ), the growth rate will be:
L = B ? N ? _
a   #   
Finally, in the technological innovation model, we have:
L = JD ? _
a + J   #   
From ( ref: quind )-( ref: dicia9 ) we can conclude that only for three cases out of five the
growth effect of income tax rates is negative. In fact, this happens only for
( ref: quind )-( ref: dicias7 ): in all the other cases, fiscal policy does not have any effect at all on
growth rate. There is a simple explanation of this result: in the models by Lucas (1988) and
Romer (1990), the growth rate is entirely determined by the growth rate of human capital and
that of accumulated projects. Therefore, since those activities are produced in non-taxed sector,
the growth rate will not be affected by the fiscal structure introduced on the final goods sector.
Thus, in a two-sector model where human capital production is not taxed at all, growth rate is not
affected by tax rates applied on the production of final goods.
Moreover, it is easy to verify from ( ref: quind )-( ref: sed ) that it does not exist any level of
b such that the growth rate turns out to be maximized footnote .
To highlight the mechanism behind this result we need to distinguish between direct and
indirect effects of tax rates. Consider first direct effects: the introduction of a tax rate lowers the
rate of return on capital and, through the investment channel, produces a negative impact on thelong-run growth rate. For the indirect effects, it is clear that in the Ak model they do not exist at
all (see ( ref: quind )). However, the assumptions on the technology producing human capital are
crucial in the determination of the effects of fiscal policy on the growth rate. In fact, from the
growth rate given by ( ref: dicias7 ), if the production of human capital is not taxed, when
income tax rate raises there will be the incentive to shift resources from the taxed sector to the
untaxed one, by lowering the steady state ratio physical/human capital (thereafter K/H).
Moreover, if the production of human capital is realized without physical capital - as in Lucas
(1988) - the decline of the ratio K/H increases the real interest rate and this completely offsets the
negative (direct) effect created by taxation.
Instead, if human capital sector employes physical capital, as in ( ref: sette ), then the
offsetting mechanism is only partial and the net effect on growth rate is negative.
This discrepancy between Lucas (1988) and Rebelo (1991) model, is a consequence of the
fact that the production of human capital is indirectly taxed when physical capital is a necessary
input, because the production of physical capital (final goods) is taxed. In fact, the taxation
effects go from the sector producing final goods (physical capital) to the sector producing human
capital, making impossible a perfect offsetting of fiscal distortions through movements in K/H.
In Romer (1986), the global effects of taxation are somehow ambiguous. It was stressed
before that this model produces a suboptimal equilibrium, since if J < 1 the growth rate of this
model is lower than what it could be obtained by a Social Planner. This non-optimality
represents the main reason for the public intervention in this model. To restore Pareto optimality,
it would useful to subsidize production through the revenue from a lump sum tax or from a
proportional tax on income.
The taxation on private inputs
The analytical context previously developed can be extended to the two-sector growth
models of endogenous growth à la Lucas (1988) and Rebelo (1991), where income taxation is
considered as taxation on the real returns of private inputs. If human capital is a non-market
good, only the real returns on factors employed in the production of final goods will be taxed.
The accumulation constraint for human capital sector is still given by ( ref: sei ). Also, the
production functions for the final goods sector and human capital are given, respectively, by




k = JA v1tKt
z1tHt
J?1
  #   
rt
h = ￿1 ? J￿A v1tKt
z1tHt
J
  #   
Moreover, I consider the same the same depreciation rate for both physical and human capital,




hz1Ht ? Ct ? NKt ? Gt   #   
where Gt is public expenditure. The government budget constraint for this economy is:
6
Bt= rtBt + Gt ? Tt   #   
where Bt represents the total amount of public debt issued at time t. The fiscal revenue Tt is




hz1Ht. Therefore, considering ( ref: venti2 ), ( ref: venti3 ) and the





Kt= rtBt + ￿1 ? bt
k￿rt
kv1Kt + ￿1 ? bt
h￿rt
hz1Ht ? Ct ? NKt   #   
To simplify matters, I consider the existence of no public debt, i.e.
6
Bt= 0. In this case, the
government budget is continuously balanced at each instant t, i.e. Gt = Tt. Although in a model
with distortionary taxation public debt is not neutral, the growth rate effects of taxation do not
change when government issues public debt.As discussed previously, the impact effect of taxation on growth depends upon the
characteristics of human capital production function. In fact, if we consider the same analytical
specification assumed by Lucas (1988), the growth rate is still given by ( ref: dici8 ), which
establishes that any form of fiscal restraint imposed on the production of final goods does not
have growth effects. As it was said before, this is due to the countervailing effect between
resources employed in the two sectors: physical and human will tend to shift to the untaxed
sector and the reduction of the ratio K/H will be compensated by an analogous offsetting of the
real returns of both K and H.
If human capital is produced with physical capital as essential input, according to equation
( ref: sette ) the growth rate will be affected by both tax rates bk, bh:
L = 1




1?J+K ? N ? _   #   








From ( ref: venti5 ) it is immediate to verify that both tax rates on physical and human capital
have a negative impact on growth rate in a multiplicative manner. The magnitude of these effects
depends upon technological parameters J, K, A, B, and the index of relative risk aversion a.
Moreover, if the technology employed in the production of physical capital and human capital is
the same, i.e. if J = K and A = B, the steady state growth rate will be:
L = 1
a A￿J￿1 ? bk￿
J￿
J￿￿1 ? J￿￿1 ? bh￿
J￿
1?J ? N ? _   #   
From ( ref: venti6 ) it is still true that taxation produces distorsive effects, whose magnitude is
directly related to the magnitude of J. Furthermore, if the level of fiscal pressure on both sectors
is equal and production functions are the same, after setting bk = bh = b, equation ( ref: venti6 )
will be modified as follows:
L = 1
a JJ￿1 ? J￿
1?JA￿1 ? b￿
J ? N ? _   #   
On the other hand, when technologies are different but bk = bh = b, the growth rate expression
given by ( ref: dicias7 ) is still valid here.
Comparing equations ( ref: venti5 )-( ref: venti7 ) we can recognize the crucial role played by
the parameters in the determination of the impact effect of taxes on growth rate. However, the
cross substitution effects among factors induced by taxation will imply that an economy
characterized by growth rate ( ref: venti5 ) will grow at a slower growth rate than an economy
characterized by ( ref: venti6 ) or ( ref: venti7 ).
It is worth to stressing that one crucial assumption of the above model is that human capital
is not a market good. By relaxing this assumption, it will be possible to extend to the production
of human capital the same kind of tax structure on inputs above considered only for the sector
producing physical capital, as in Stockey and Rebelo (1995) and Pecorino (1993). It is not
difficult to justify the production of human capital as a market activity. In fact, in many advanced
economies it is possible to observe that human capital formation and educational activities can
be activities market oriented, not dissimilarly from the production of physical capital. In this
case, those activities become subjected to taxation as well. Since human capital enters directly
into the production of final goods, as in ( ref: otto ), we may interpret human capital as an
intermediate good produced by a separate sector not integrated with the production of final
goods. Thus, when the real returns of inputs employed in the production of final goods and
human capital are taxed, we will end up with an expression of the growth rate depending upon all
fiscal parameters of the model, showing up the problem of the double taxation of productive
factors.
In terms of the convergence issue two economies will exhibit the same growth rate and the
same convergence rate not only if they are similar with respect to their technological parameters,
but also if their fiscal structure will be equal. Those issues are crucial especially if we consider
how many parameters enter into the definition of the growth rate.When in the production function for final goods ( ref: otto ), we insert a non-reproducible
factor, like for example land, indicated by X, whose return is taxed at a rate different from what
employed in the other inputs, we have that the tax rate on X will not affect at all the real interest
rate and the growth rate, as proved by Rebelo (1991). In other words, growth rate is not affected
by the tax rates imposed on non-reproducible factors inserted as inputs in the production of final
goods.
Endogenous Fiscal Policy
The models described so far did consider neither the problem of an optimal degree of public
expenditure (and consequently, of taxation) nor the problem of the determinant of public
expenditure and its effect on growth and distribution. Indeed, this is quite a broad topic since it
involves several issues, like optimal public expenditure and political equilibria based on the size
of public expenditure. In what follows I distinguish between models without an explicit
treatment of human capital and models where human capital plays a significant role together
with other production inputs.
Models without human capital
One possible way to endogenize public expenditure is to remove the assumption which
makes public expenditure completely useless inside the model by opening a role for it as a
productive input in the final goods sector, along the lines of Barro (1990) and Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (1992b). The main results of those papers are based on a different definition of the
input Zt in ( ref: uno ), which now can be interpreted as a pure public good. In other words:
Zt = Gt, where Gt indicates the total level of public expenditure in period t entirely invested in
the production of a public good. A possible interpretation considers Gt as the total amount of
public infrastructures and facilities provided by the Government to the private sector. Following
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992b),it is possible to consider three different definitions of Gt:
(i) public goods, as publicly provided good, but rival and excludable (like a private good);
(ii) pure public goods, non-rival and non-excludable (like, f.e., defense expenditure);
(iii) public goods subjected to congestion phenomena (like, for example, highways, streets, green
areas, etc.).
In cases (i)-(iii) it is assumed that the production of public goods is realized through a
technology similar to what is employed by private sector to produce market goods footnote .
In (i) Gt is the total quantity of public services allocated to each producer. In fact, given N
the total number of entrepreneurs of a given economy, we have that g = G/N, and in ( ref: uno )
Zt = gt. The private real return on investment is:
rt = JA
1?J
  #   
where k is the per capita stock employed by each single firm. Even in this case, as in Romer
(1986), the private real return on capital is non-optimal and the growth rate will be lower than
what we could obtain under a Social Planning solution. To finance public expenditure, the
Government imposes a proportional tax rate b on aggregate income. From the balance budget
condition we have that by = g for all t. Therefore, on a BGP the steady-state growth rate is:
L = 1
a ￿1 ? b￿b
1?J
J JA1/J ? N ? _   #   
The growth rate for a Social Planner economy is:
LSP = 1
a ￿1 ? b￿b
1?J
J A1/J ? N ? _   #   
By comparison of ( ref: venti9 ) and ( ref: trenta ), we get that L < LSP, since J < 1. It is also
easy to show that the growth maximizing tax rate bD is:
bD = 1 ? J   #   
Note that bD = 0 if and only if J = 1, i.e. public expenditure becomes useless when physical
capital has enough constant returns by itself.
In case (ii) G represents a pure public good in the sense of Samuelson. The budget balancecondition implies that for each instant t G = by. Now the growth rate will be footnote :
L = 1




J ? N ? _   #   
In this case too, the growth maximizing tax rate will be given by ( ref: trenta1 ). It is worthwhile
to note that ( ref: trenta2 ) depends upon N which is the total number of firms operating in this
economy. This suggests that the growth rate depends on the size of the economy. This aspect has
a difficult interpretation because empirical regularities show that large countries are slow
growers relatively to small countries, as discussed, for example, by Levine and Renelt (1992).
This undesirable effect can be by-passed when we abstract from the concept of nation and we
consider the economic region as replacing the idea of State-nation. Under this interpretation, L is
the growth rate of an economic region which can encompass areas belonging to several nations
but sharing similar characteristics with respect to the economic conditions.





  #   
When income is high we have a sort of crowding out effect on G that reduce its positive
externality effects in the productive process. In this case, the growth rate here is:
L = 1
a ￿1 ? b￿b
1?J
J A1/J ? N ? _   #   
with a growth maximizing tax rate still equal to ( ref: trenta1 ).
From the growth rate expressions ( ref: venti9 ), ( ref: trenta2 ) and ( ref: trenta4 ) and their
respective social planning solutions, we observe a non-linear effect of fiscal policy and public
expenditure on growth. The overall effect depends whether b is lower or bigger than the optimal
bD. In other words, if we indicate with LD the growth rate corresponding to the optimal tax rate bD
we have:
L ‡ LD ø b † bD
L < LD ø b > bD
This results shows that the growth effect of a proportional tax rate is not necessarily negative and
the function L = f￿b￿ assumes a behavior of an inverted U. Therefore, if b = G/Y the growth
maximizing tax rate is exactly equal to the share of public expenditure (or total expenditure on
investment goods) on aggregate income. Before the optimal tax rate (the optimal ratio G/Y￿ is
reached, the advantage of an higher taxation good is higher than costs, because the fiscal revenue
is invested in investment good. The opposite happens when the tax rate is higher than its socially
optimal level: the positive effects of having a higher level of public goods are more than
compensated by the cost of an higher level of taxation.
However, it should be recognized that the optimal level of the tax rate b represents a Second
Best solution, due to the distortions caused by a proportional income taxation. Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (1992b) showed that the First best solution with the highest growth rate can be
achieved through lump-sum taxation footnote . The case with public goods subjected to
congestion represents probably the most favorable framework to restore Pareto-optimality. In
fact, in this case the distortions are originated by an excessive use of the public good by private
agents: the introduction of a tax rate reports the economy on the optimal path.
Another possible way to endogenize public expenditure is to insert the public expenditure as
an argument of the utility function, as in Barro (1990). In this case, given G as the amount of




e?_t￿u￿Ct￿ + d￿Gt￿￿   #   
with u
v
￿6￿ > 0, d
v
￿6￿ > 0, u
vv
￿6￿ < 0, d
vv
￿6￿ < 0. If we specify a Cobb-Douglas utility function
for ( ref: extra ), we still obtain the same class of results considered before for the production
case, i.e., an inverted-U relationship between taxes and the growth rate.The analytical context introduced by Barro (1990) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992b) can
be easily extended to more complex models. One example is represented by Cashin (1995)
where government spending on physical capital and transfers are inputs of the production
function of private goods. We have two state variables: the stock of private physical capital and
the stock of public physical capital. Basically, public expenditure can be divided into two
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where Gt/Kt is the ratio of public aggregate capital stock Gt to the aggregate capital stock Kt, and
Tt/Kt is the ratio of aggregate public transfer payments Tt to the aggregate private capital stock.
As in Romer (1986), we assume that the aggregate level of capital stock is defined as: Kt = Nkt
where N is the number (constant) of private firms operating in this economy and kt is the
capital-labor ratio for each firm. Equation ( ref: trenta5 ) is linear in kt for given Gt/Kt and Tt/Kt,
and exhibits increasing returns to scale with respect to all the inputs considered together. The
rationale behind the presence of Gt/Kt is the same as for the public goods with congestion
described above. To justify the presence of transfers Tt/Kt Cashin (1995) argues that public
transfers represent a way to raise the after-tax private return to capital through the reduction of
inefficiencies and excess burden derived from a poor protection of property rights. In general, we
can distinguish between intergenarational and intragenerational transfers: Sala-i-Martin (1992)
provides a rationale justification for intragenerational transfers which would enforce private
property rights and reduce the aggregate distortions. A better enforcement of property rights
would incentivate people to accumulate capital and it would have a positive effect on the growth
rate footnote . The resource constraints for this economy are:
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Gt are, respectively, the investment in private and public capital. Tt is total fiscal
revenue while b1, b2 are the marginal tax rate used to finance the production of public physical
capital (as in ( ref: trenta7 )) and transfers (as in ( ref: trenta8 )). There is not public debt and
each sector of the whole public activity cannot be financed by borrowing from another sector.
After some algebra along the lines described by Cashin (1995), it is possible to obtain an implicit
function relating the growth rate of the economy to tax rates b1, b2. Given that the growth
maximizing tax rates are b1
D = J, b2
D = K, it its easy to show that the model presents the same
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Once again, the relationship between fiscal variables and growth is an U-inverted curve: the
effect of tax rate on growth will be positive if the size of government is lower than optimal. Even
if this model lacks of a more precise definition of Government Expenditure, it represents a good
starting point in highlighting the growth diminishing effect of distortionary taxes and the growth
enhancing effect caused by the public provision of public goods and transfers.
Models with human capital
An interesting question is to see what are the growth effects of taxes employed to finance apublic expenditure which is used as exclusive input in the production of human capital or,
alternatively, in the production of final goods. This line of research has been put foreword by
Corsetti and Roubini (1996). In this section I will briefly discuss the model by Corsetti and
Roubini (1996), later on I will treat the problem of optimal taxation involved with it. The main
result of this paper is not too dissimilar from the seminal contribution by Barro (1990). The
difference is that there are now two sector, one producing final goods and the other producing
human capital, and two tax rates, one on physical capital and the other on human capital. The
negative effects on input taxation can be enhanced by a productive Government expenditure,
whose effect is to reduce the distorsive effect of taxation. Intuitively: the inclusion of
Government expenditure in the production function generates rents which can be appropriated
either by human or by physical capital, according to the modelling structure. The role of the tax
rate is to extract these rents. With this respect, the model shows a positive effect of taxes on
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In ( ref: trenta9 ) the variables have the usual meaning, apart from P which represents the
productivity of public expenditure Gt in the final goods sector. When P = 1, then public
expenditure is not a required input in the production of final goods. The production of human




K￿1?g￿   #   
In ( ref: quaranta ) g indicates the productivity of public expenditure in the human capital sector.
The model is general enough to provide a wide taxonomy of cases according to different
assumptions on P and g.
To get the rental rate of capital Rt
1k and the wage rate Rt
1h we need to make assumptions on
which factor in what sector appropriates rents deriving from Gt. As a matter of example, assume
that public expenditure is a productive input only in sector one and that g = 0. Therefore,
physical capital is the factor which appropriates rents coming from public expenditure. Define
now the rental rate on physical capital in sector 1 net of rents deriving from public expenditure as
rt
1k. Finally, let rt





1G. So, by using ( ref: trenta9 ) and by dropping time dependence for vit,
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The wage rate is:
Rt
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The following table collects all the possibilities arising from different assumptions on the
parameters of the model, without reporting the entire set of algebraic expressions that can be
recovered along the guidelines discussed before:Parameters Factor appropriating
rents from G
Model 1 P > 0, g = 1 K
Model 2 P > 0, g = 1 H
Model 3 P = 1, g > 0 K
Model 4 P = 1, g > 0 H
Table 1
From table 1 we observe that Model 3 and 4 both consider the production of human capital
as subjected to externalities deriving from G while the production of final goods is realized in
sector 1 without G. If we assume that only inputs employed in the production of final goods are
taxed, the accumulation constraint is given by ( ref: venti4 ). The accumulation constraint for
human capital is still described by ( ref: sei ). We assume also that the government budget
constraint is instantaneously satisfied without issuing public debt. The total fiscal revenue is still




1hz1Ht, with Gt = Tt. For expository reasons, I consider here a
simple model without the endogenous choice between labor and leisure, by assuming that the
utility function of the representative agent is given by ( ref: quat ). The resulting expression for
the growth rate is:
L = 1
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where Ci, @i i = 1,2,3,4 are constant terms including the constant parameters (both fiscal and
non-fiscal) of each model considered in the table. In the particular case considered in the












The growth rate of this model is higher than in the case without productive government
expenditure. Therefore, even if taxation has a negative effect on growth, we have that growth rate
is higher for each level of taxation. Moreover, as in Barro (1990), it is possible to get the same
kind of nonlinear effect due to taxation such that for low level of government expenditure and
taxation (assuming continuous balanced budget) the positive effects of an higher public
expenditure are higher than the distortions induced by taxation, in such a way that the overall
effect on growth rate is positive. Through this way, it is always possible to define a trigger level
of taxation beyond that we have a negative effect on growth rate.
The message of this model is twofold: in one sense, it represents the extension to the
two-sector case of the Barro (1990) model discussed in the previous section. At the same time, it
allows a better discussion of the usage of public expenditure and public investment, by including
the opportunity for investment in human capital. Another advantage of the analytical framework
adopted by Corsetti and Roubini (1996) hinges on its high reliability which allows to distinguish
between several particular cases within a unique general framework.
Imperfectly Competitive Markets
The inclusion of imperfect competition in the production of final goods or in the production
of human capital makes all the results on taxation above described enriched by another degree of
freedom. The study of monopolistic competition in growth models is primarily due to Grossman
and Helpman (1991), and Romer (1990). The explicit study of the links between monopolistic
competition and taxation in growth models is due to Judd (1997). This line of research shows
that fiscal policy represents an additional distortion to the existing one represented by the
presence of monopolistic competition assumed in the production of final goods. In this way,monopolistically competitive markets amplify the distortions created by fiscal policy. Judd
(1997) focuses on optimal taxation: in a world with monopolistic competition in the final good
sector, the optimal tax rate on capital is negative (i.e. it becomes a subsidy). This is because the
government acts in order to compensate firms from the loss to be in an imperfectly competitive
market.
In this section, I will describe a simple model useful to address these issues. The model here
presented is similar to Judd (1997), but I will not consider the endogenous choice between labor
and leisure on the side of the representative agent.
In this economy we have a continuum of individuals indexed by j on ￿0,1￿. We also have two
types of goods: a consumption good and a capital good entering as input in the production
function. There is a continuum of differentiated consumption and capital goods, each indexed by
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with S > 1. It is clear from ( ref: quaranta4 ) that all the differentiated consumption goods are















j￿i￿di   #   
In ( ref: quaranta5 ) Rit
j indicates the real rate of return on capital good i for agent j, bt
i is the tax
rate on the real return Rit
j , assumed equal across all individual j; wt
j is the wage rate for agent j,
while Lt
j is its labor supply; ^it
j is the profit of the consumer-entrepreneur j coming from the firm
producing good i. The implicit assumption on ( ref: quaranta5 ) is that we have no public debt.








j didj for all t,and we do not have any particular assumption on
the usage of public expenditure G.
This economy has a decentralized equilibrium where the decisions of firms and consumers
are totally separated. Firms and consumers meet on the market only when their supplies and
demands are equated. Each representative consumer j faces two kind of problem: an
intra-temporal allocation problem given by the choice of consumption goods ct￿i￿ among the
infinite varieties i 5 ￿0,1￿ available on the market. However, there is also an intertemporal
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Let us consider now the intratemporal condition. Define Et
j as the total expenditure on
consumption goods for the single agent j. Each agent j optimally chooses ct
j￿i￿ in
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Equation ( ref: quaranta8 ) is the demand equation for good i expressed from agent j, and S is the
demand elasticity. Equation ( ref: quaranta9 ) is the aggregate price index over good i. Define by
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Consider now the problem for the representative firm. The production function for the i-th
firm producing the i-th differentiated good is:
yt￿i￿ = AitXit
JLit
1?J   #   
where Xit is the amount of differentiated good employed in the production of the i-th good.
Define the capital aggregate Xjt as:









  #   
where Kt
j￿i￿ indicates the capital stock of good j employed in the production of good i. In
( ref: 52 ) I assume the same elasticity of demand for final goods, S > 1. Therefore, each firm i
producing good i owned by agent j maximizes its profit ^t
j￿i￿ defined as:
^t
j￿i￿ = pt￿i￿yt￿i￿ ? Rt
j￿i￿Kt
j￿i￿ ? Wt￿i￿Lt￿i￿   #   
In each instant firm i chooses the optimal amount of Kt
j￿i￿ and Lt
j￿i￿ in order to maximize its
profit given by ( ref: 53 ) subjected to ( ref: cinquanta )-( ref: 52 ). From the profit maximization
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Wt
j￿i￿ = 1 ? 1
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From ( ref: 54 )-( ref: 55 ) we observe that the assumption of monopolistic competitive market
makes factor remuneration different from what should be in a perfectly competitive market. In
fact, if S = 1 then ( ref: 54 )-( ref: 55 ) will be the same as in a perfect competitive market for
final goods. In this formulation the mark-up over marginal cost is defined as W ﬂ 1 ? 1
S
S (the demand elasticity of final goods), higher will be the market power of the
representative firm and higher will be the margin over costs. On the other hand, since S is always
strictly bigger than one (by assumption), then from ( ref: 54 )-( ref: 55 ) we have that factor
remuneration are lower than in perfectly competitive markets.
To get the equilibrium representation of the economy above described, I normalize
( ref: quaranta5 ) with respect to the aggregate price index which for simplicity is set equal to
one, i.e. Pt = 1. Moreover, I assume the existence of a symmetric equilibrium across goods and
agents, by supposing that all agents and firms are the same and that everybody makes the same
choices among the differentiated goods to be consumed and invested. In order to aggregate over
all agent, let Vt
j￿i￿ be the total demand of good i expressed by agent j, then the total demand for




j￿i￿dj. Therefore, under symmetry, we have:
Kt￿i￿ = Kt, Xt￿i￿ = Xit = Xt, Rt￿i￿ = Rt, Wt￿i￿ = Wt, Lt￿i￿ = Lit = Lt for all i 5 ￿0,1￿.
Moreover, we have that X
0
1
pt￿i￿ct￿i￿di = Ct which is the total consumption expressed by each
agent i. The aggregate accumulation constraint ( ref: quaranta5 ) will be:
6
Kt = ￿1 ? b￿RtKt ? NKt + ^t + WtLt ? Ct   #   
To make easier all the comparisons with the previous models, define with rt the rate or return on
capital in a perfectly competitive market (with S = 0 in the above model), i.e. rt = JAKt
J?1Lt
1?J.
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From ( ref: 57 ) we note that the presence of monopolistic competition adds an additional
distortion to the growth rate which has a multiplicative effect with respect to the distorsive
taxation. In other words: the distorsive effect of taxation is magnified by the presence of
imperfectly competitive markets. The background just discussed represents a good starting point
for the optimal taxation analysis as in Judd (1997), where it is shown that in presence of
monopolistic competition, the optimal taxation on capital must be negative in order to
compensate for the distortion coming from an imperfect good market.
The model just presented is highly stylized. The same kind of framework can be easily
generalized to all the models previously discussed, without changing the main result.
Endogenous Labor Supply
One of the typical assumptions of the neoclassical growth model is that agents adjust
instantaneously their labor supply in response to whatsoever shock either on the production side
or on the demand side. Recently, however, we have several models trying to analyze the growth
effects of flat-rate taxes when an endogenous choice between labor and leisure is introduced in
the model. Among the more representative papers in this area we have Jones, Manuelli and Rossi
(1993), Roubini and Milesi-Ferretti (1994a,b), Milesi-Ferretti and Roubini (1995), Devereux and
Love (1994, 1995). It does not exist neither a unique way to define “leisure” nor a unique,
standard way to endogenize the choice between labor and leisure, as witnessed by the literature
on Real Business Cycles (RBC). Among RBC studies, it is worth mentioning here Benhabib,
Rogerson and Wright (1991), and Greenwood and Hercowitz (1991), who follow the definition
of leisure as homework production, as in Becker (1965). With endogenous labor supply, the
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where §t represents leisure in raw form and b is a function such that b : ￿0,1￿ ‚ '+, with b
v > 0,
b
vv < 0. Finally, S represents the fraction of utility allocated to each argument, interpreted also as
the elasticity of intra-temporal substitution between consumption and leisure. The leisure in raw
form § is defined as the total amount of time remaining to the single agent, after the fraction of
time devolved to human capital accumulation and to the final goods production. One particular
function for b is a simple linear case as b￿§t￿ = §t. The model can be completed by considering
together with ( ref: 58 ) a two-sector model as described by equation ( ref: sei )-( ref: otto ): in
this case, §t is defined as §t = 1 ? z1t ? z2t (when we normalize to 1 the endowment of time
disposable to the single agent).
The extension considered by ( ref: 58 ) will add to the model another state variable § and one
more first order condition that will make the set of first order conditions no more
block-recursive. As a consequence, in the expression of the growth rate we would have a term
depending upon z1 and z2. To be more explicit, in a two-sector economy let ﬁ be a constant term
formed by all the parameters of the model, and let
￿
b￿§￿ be a function of z1 and z2 representing
the fraction of human capital employed in the production of final goods (or physical capital) and
human capital, whose sum can vary as response to fiscal policy shocks. The growth rate of this
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Devereux and Love (1994, 1995) showed that fiscal policy has always a distorsive effect on
growth rate when leisure is considered in a raw form, independently upon the assumptions on the
production function of final goods and human capital.
Under alternative definitions of leisure we obtain different results. One possibility is toreplace in ( ref: 58 ) b￿§t￿ with b￿§t￿Ht. In this case, leisure in raw form is adjusted by the level of
human capital Ht: this extension defines the Quality time model of endogenous labor supply. In
this case leisure is represented by a production function whose unique input is human capital and
the output is interpretable as the result of a working activity which uses a fraction of labor
different from what is supplied in the market or in the accumulation of human capital.
In a broader sense, it is possible to extend the Quality time model to a more complex
production function whose inputs are now physical and human capital. Let YN be the final output








1 ? a   #   
Basically, the introduction of the production YN is like to insert a third sector into a model
producing a non-market good. In this context, fiscal policy will affect the choice between
consumption and non-market activities (homework production function) and the intersectoral
factor allocation. In fact, a fiscal shock in the market oriented sectors will inhibit the supply of
inputs to be employed in market sector by distracting resources in favor of the homework
activities. In this sense, the production YN can be interpreted as a complex set of activities out of
control of fiscal authorities: under this interpretation it represents a potential source of tax
evasion. In fact, if non-market activities are produced with the same technology as market goods,
then a fiscal policy shock will shift the production from the “legal” sector to the “illegal” one,
whose income is unobservable and therefore non taxable. Moreover, an high level of fiscal
pressure on the “legal” sector will shift resources in favor of the “illegal” one, making even
worse the problem of fiscal revenue collection, given the reduction of the tax base following
from a reallocation of productive resources.
Finally, in a two-sector model the functional specification of the non-market activities does
not affect at all the analytical expressions of the growth rate, which is still given by
( ref: venti5 )-( ref: venti7 ), according to the various assumptions on the model.
The Consumption Tax
In the public finance literature consumption taxation has always played an important role.
John Stuart Mill and more recently Fischer (1937) and Kaldor (1955) have offered arguments in
favor of consumption taxes rather than income taxes. The traditional debate focused on both
efficiency and equity arguments footnote . In particular, the Mill’s concern is mainly related with
an efficiency argument and is about the principle of double taxation of savings as a consequence
of an income tax, but not of a consumption tax. In fact, taxing income distorts the
consumption-saving decision, while a consumption tax uniform over time imposes the same
burden on current and future consumption. On the other hand, the relative optimality of
consumption versus income taxation can be expressed as a question on the optimality of tax rates
over current and future consumption. In fact, consumption tax introduces a distortion into the
work-leisure choice. Therefore, the final judgement has to do with the relative substitutability of
consumption and leisure at different point in time. According to standard optimal taxation
principles, given that leisure is untaxed, we should tax more heavily goods that are more
complementary and/or substitutable with consumption. Moreover, in a world where labor supply
is exogenous, a uniform consumption tax is equivalent to a wage tax when there is no leisure.
Thus, in this last case, we are back to the traditional debate on relative optimality. between a
wage (or consumption) tax rate and a capital tax rate. By following the same kind of argument
about efficiency, it is also possible to reach different conclusions according to the particular
specification adopted in the model. A general presumption, however, implies that a uniform
consumption tax will be superior to income taxation if the utility function is separable between
consumption and leisure and preferences are homothetic over consumption at different dates.
Equity arguments are manly based on the view that it is fairer to tax people on what they
consume rather than on what they produce, as stressed by Kaldor (1955).In the endogenous growth context, Devereux and Love (1994, 1995) showed in a two-sector
model that consumption tax affects negatively growth rate only if leisure is modelled in a raw
form. In fact, for a model similar to that described by ( ref: 58 ) and ( ref: 59 ) with b￿§t￿ = §t, we
have that growth rate depends on the total amount of time spent in the market sector and in the
human capital accumulation activity through the function b￿§t￿ = §t. Therefore, a consumption
tax affects the choice on labor supply in both productive sectors through the usual mechanisms of
income and substitution effects footnote .
If leisure is modelled according to the homework production or Quality Time approach, then
the consumption tax does not produce any effect at all on the growth rate. In fact, the mechanism
at work here is exactly the same as we have seen in the discussion on taxation of the
non-reproducible factors. There are no links between the homework activities and the aggregate
consumption, given the fact that in the expression for the growth rate there is any variable
describing the leisure allocation.
The Investment Tax
Following Rebelo (1991), assume that the production of new investment goods uses a
proportion 1 ? ft, 0 < ft † 1, of the entire amount of capital in a model where the production
function is of the Ak type. The accumulation constraint is:
6
Kt = It = A￿1 ? ft￿Kt where It
indicates the gross investment, and the other variable have the usual meaning. Suppose also that
the production of consumption good Ct requires a proportion ft of the aggregate capital stock
with a Cobb-Douglas production function:
Ct = B￿ftKt￿
JTt
1?J   #   
with 0 < J † 1. In ( ref: 60 ) Tt is a fixed non-reproducible factor and B is a constant
productivity parameter. Let pt be the relative price of investment goods in term of consumption
goods and Yt be the aggregate income. The resource constraint for this economy is
Yt = Ct + ptIt.
Suppose now that between the interest rate for loans denominated in consumption-goods
term rc and the real return to capital rk holds the following arbitrage relation:
rct = rkt +
6
pt
pt   #   
where
6
pt /pt indicates the rate of variation of the investment goods price expressed in terms of
consumption good. It is just the non-constancy of pt which makes rct and rkt different. From the
profit maximization condition for each single firm we obtain the usual condition of equality of
the marginal product in both sectors (consumption and investment):
pt￿1 ? ft￿A = JB￿ftKt￿
J?1   #   
Therefore, if ft is constant over time, we will have that
6
pt /pt = ￿J ? 1￿Lk where Lk is the
growth rate of physical capital. In other words: the price of capital good decreases with a rate
which is proportional to the growth rate of physical capital itself. The equilibrium on the
aggregate capital markets requires that for a given tax rate on physical capital bk the rate of
return rk will be:
rk = ￿1 ? f￿￿1 ? bk￿A ? N   #   
Finally, from the arbitrage condition ( ref: 61 ) we have:
rc = ￿1 ? f￿￿1 ? bk￿A ? N + ￿J ? 1￿Lk   #   
Therefore, with an isoelastic utility function having a constant degree of relative risk aversion
like ( ref: quat ), the consumption growth rate Lc can be expressed as: Lc = ￿rc ? _￿/a. By
inserting ( ref: 64 ) into the expression for Lc and using from ( ref: 60 ) the fact that Lc = JLk we
get:
Lk = ￿1 ? f￿￿1 ? bk￿A ? N ? _
1 ? ￿1 ? J￿a
  #   Lc = J ￿1 ? f￿￿1 ? bk￿A ? N ? _
1 ? ￿1 ? J￿a
  #   
From ( ref: 65 )-( ref: 66 ) we have that taxation on investment is somehow similar to capital
taxation and has negative consequences on the growth rate, as it appears from the fact that
/Lc//bk < 0. Moreover, the tax rate on physical capital which maximizes the consumption
growth rate is equal to zero and corresponds to the optimal long-run tax rate on capital.
The model just described is extremely stylized and does not consider a set of complex
interactions deriving, for example, from the degree of substitution between factors in the
production function of the two goods. However, even in a more complex model the results will
be similar to what has been showed here: the investment tax is interpretable as a tax on new
capital and it affects growth and accumulation exactly in the same fashion as we have described
in the previous sections.
Optimal taxation
The problem of optimal taxation has been implicitly treated in many cases considered in the
previous sections. One of these examples is certainly represented by the Barro (1990) model
where the growth maximizing tax rate is the same of the tax rate which maximizes the welfare of
the representative agent, with a CRRA utility function. Probably, the more interesting case is the
two-sector model where income taxation assumes the form of taxation of real returns of the
productive inputs.
The optimal taxation analysis can be thought as a part of the well known “Ramsey Problem”
where the choices of the social planner on the optimal tax are constrained by the conditions
describing the optimizing behavior of the representative agent. We can generally distinguish
between two approaches: the first is adopted by Chamley (1985, 1986) and Judd (1987) in a
growth model with exogenous technical progress. This approach finds the optimal tax structure
as the result of the maximization of the indirect utility function of the representative agent
subjected to the first order conditions derived as result of the optimal choice of the consumption
plan. The second approach, mainly followed by Lucas (1990), Chari, Christiano and Kehoe
(1991), Bull (1993a), Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1993), Roubini and Milesi-Ferretti (1994a,b),
Milesi-Ferretti and Roubini (1995), Corsetti and Roubini (1996), leaves directly to the social
planner the task of finding the optimal quantities of consumption, production and investment
plans subjected to the intertemporal budget constraint and the resource constraint. This method
will deliver functional forms linking the optimal quantities to the tax rates. The comparison
between the first order condition of the choice problem of the social planner and the first order of
the representative agent will show the optimal tax structure.
The optimal taxation analysis in exogenous growth models reveals that the optimal tax on
capital should be zero, while the tax on labor should be positive. However, in endogenous
growth models we obtain a multiplicity of results depending upon the particular assumptions
considered in the model. In particular, if public expenditure is endogenous as, for example, in
Barro (1990), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1993), Judd (1990),
Zhu (1992), then the optimal long-run tax on capital must be equal to zero. On the other hand, if
public expenditure is endogenous and generates externalities in a two-sector model along the
same lines of Corsetti and Roubini (1996), then the optimal tax on physical and human capital
strictly depends upon which factor appropriates the rents generated by public expenditure. For
example, if physical capital is the factor appropriating rents from public expenditure, then the
optimal tax on it will be positive and zero the tax on human capital (the reverse is true when
human capital is the factor appropriating rents).
On the other hand, if the externalities in the production function are generated by other
factors and not by public expenditure, as in Romer (1987, 1990) and Lucas (1988), the optimal
taxation plan considers subsidies for the activities with generating positive
externalities footnote .
When we consider some upper limits to tax rates on certain inputs, like for example human
capital, the long run optimal tax rate on capital is positive again, as showed by Jones, Manuelliand Rossi (1993b).
A discussion on the optimal structure of indirect taxation is conducted by Bull (1993a,b) and
by Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1993a). Moreover, the issue of an optimal consumption tax rate is
discussed by Milesi-Ferretti and Roubini (1995).
In an open economy context, the same type of analysis is conducted by Rebelo (1992), and
Razin and Yuen (1992a,b).
In the literature above cited it is generally showed that the results on the zero-tax rate on
capital can be maintained even in the endogenous growth context, unless some particular
assumptions are inserted in the model. Moreover, for a whatsoever functional form assumed for
the homework activities in a model with human capital accumulation, if there are not limits to
human capital taxation, the optimal long-run tax rates on both human and physical capital should
be zero. In particular, if labor supply is exogenously given and human capital formation does not
require physical capital as necessary input, the optimal long run tax rate on physical capital is
zero, while on human capital is positive. However, this is the unique case the two-sector model
of endogenous growth without endogenous public expenditure where we have an asymmetry
between long run optimal taxes on physical and human capital. In general, we have symmetric
optimal tax rates on physical and human capital: both they are either positive or zero. Moreover,
the positive optimal tax rate is obtained when there are rents to be appropriated or when there are
some upper limits on taxation of some inputs footnote  (in these cases we could also get
asymmetry, as previously discussed). In exogenous growth models, instead, the asymmetry
between the two tax rates is the usual result.
Probably, one of the more striking result coming from the endogenous growth literature is the
symmetric results on the fiscal tax rates on productive inputs, and its ability in discerning several
particular cases where the asymmetric result cannot be obtained. It is worthwhile to stress that
the symmetric result is almost a natural consequence, given the fact that with an asymmetric long
run optimal tax structure the representative agent will have the incentive in misreporting the
source of its income, in order to avoid fiscal pressure.
Concluding Remarks
This paper surveys some of the more important and recent results on the literature on fiscal
policy and growth, in the endogenous growth context. Given the enormous amount of literature,
this survey concentrated on infinite-horizon representative agent models with one and two
productive sector, considering also the case of imperfectly competitive markets. It has been
shown that the heterogeneity of results and point of views present in the literature strictly
depends upon the particular assumption of the underlying model. This is also reflected on the
optimal taxation analysis.
Given the number of contributions in this area and the various different framework analyzed,
probably it is not hazardous to define the state of this literature as mature. New areas of research
are offered by a more careful analysis of fiscal policy issues in growth models with imperfect
competition, and by quantitative research and sensitivity analysis on all the other models of the
literature.
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